Abstract. This paper presents a practical cryptanalysis of the Identification Scheme proposed by Patarin at Crypto 1996. This scheme relies on the hardness of the Isomorphism of Polynomial with One Secret (IP1S), and enjoys shorter key than many other schemes based on the hardness of a combinatorial problem (as opposed to numbertheoretic problems). Patarin proposed concrete parameters that have not been broken faster than exhaustive search so far. On the theoretical side, IP1S has been shown to be harder than Graph Isomorphism, which makes it an interesting target. We present two new deterministic algorithms to attack the IP1S problem, and we rigorously analyze their complexity and success probability. We show that they can solve a (big) constant fraction of all the instances of degree two in polynomial time. We verified that our algorithms are very efficient in practice. All the parameters with degree two proposed by Patarin are now broken in a few seconds. The parameters with degree three can be broken in less than a CPU-month. The identification scheme is thus quite badly broken.
Our Results. We present two new "rigorous" and deterministic algorithms. On the practical side, these algorithms are efficient: random quadratic IP1S instances and random cubic inhomogeneous IP1S instances can be broken in time O n 6 for any size of the parameters. In particular, all the quadratic IP1S challenges proposed by Patarin are now broken in a few seconds. The biggest cubic IP1S challenge can be broken in less than 1 CPU-month. The IP1S identification scheme is thus broken beyond repair in the quadratic case. In the case of cubic IP1S, our attack runs in time O n 6 × q n , and the security parameter have to be seriously reconsidered, which makes the scheme much less attractive, since the key size is cubic in n.
A rigorous analysis of our algorithms is both necessary and tricky. When generating linear equations, special care has to be taken to count how many of them are independent. The recent history of algebraic cryptanalysis taught us that failure to do so may have drastic consequences. Additionally, the complexity of Gröbner bases computation, even though a bit more well-understood now in the generic case, is still often a delicate matter for structured systems.
A unique and distinctive feature of our algorithms compared to the previous state of affairs, and one of our main theoretical contribution, is that we characterize the class of instances that can be solved by our techniques in polynomial time. We show, for instance, that a (big) constant fraction of all quadratic IP1S instances can be solved in polynomial time.
Organisation of the paper. In section 2, we recall some useful facts about the IP1S problem. Then, in section 3, we introduce the identification scheme based on the hardness of IP1S and compare it to other non-number theoretic based ID schemes. We then introduce our algorithms to break IP1S in the quadratic case in section 4, and in the cubic case in section 5.
The IP1S Problem
We recall the definition of the IP1S problem. Given two families of polynomials a and b in F q [x 1 , . . . , x n ] u the task is to find an invertible matrix S ∈ GL n (F q ) and a vector c ∈ (F q ) n such that:
b(x) = a(S · x + c).
We will denote by f (k) the homogeneous component of degree k of f , and by extension a (k) denotes the vector of polynomials obtained by taking the homogeneous components of degree k of all the coordinates of a. We define the derivative of a in c to be the function ∂a ∂c : x → a(x + c) + a(x). The following lemma is very useful, and is at the heart of the techniques proposed in [17] . Lemma 1. i) For all k ≥ 1, we have:
• S. Proof. Let us write T (x) = T ℓ · x + T c and S(x) = S ℓ · x + S c where T ℓ and S ℓ are n × n matrices, whereas S c and T c are vectors of (F q ) n . We have:
b(x) = T c + T ℓ · a(S ℓ · x + S c ) = T c + T ℓ · Da(S ℓ · x, S c ) + a(S ℓ · x) + a(S c ) − a(0)
The first statement follows from the application of [17, lemma 4] to the last equality. The second and third statements are direct consequences of the first one.
⊓ ⊔
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A useful consequence of lemma 1 is that without loss of generality we may assume c to be the null vector 4 . A consequence of point ii) is that from any instance of the problem we can deduce a linear homogeneous instance by considering only the homogeneous component of highest degree. If this instance can be solved, and S can be retrieved, then recovering c is not difficult, using a slight generalization of the idea shown in [24] . If S is known, then ∂a ∂c can be explicitly computed, and c can usually be deduced therefrom. For instance, focusing on the homogeneous component of degree one yields a system of u · n linear equations in n variables that admits c as a solution. In most cases, it will in fact admit only c as a solution, which enables recovering c.
It was pointed out in [39] that if there is only one quadratic polynomial, then the problem is easily solved in polynomial time. This follows from the fact that quadratic forms admit a canonical representation (see for instance [29] ). The change of coordinate can be then easily computed. We will therefore focus on the case of u ≥ 2 when the polynomials are quadratic.
For various reasons, the IP1S problem becomes easier when u is close to n, and harder when u is small. For instance, the algorithm given in [40] deals with the case u = n in polynomial time, but cannot tackle the case where u = 2 and n is big, which prevented it from breaking the parameters proposed by Patarin. Additionally, small values of u leads to smaller public keys. Therefore, we will restrict our attention to the case where u = 2 when the polynomials are quadratic, and where u = 1 when they are cubic. These are the most cryptographically relevant cases, and the most challenging. We will also consider the case where F q is a field of characteristic two. It can be shown that this makes the problem a bit harder, but again this is the most cryptographically relevant case. The quadratic and cubic IP1S problems are very different and lead to specific approaches, therefore we will discuss them separately.
Patarin's IP1S-Based identification Scheme
Zero-Knowledge proofs were introduced in 1985 by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff in [26] . Soon afterwards, Fiat and Shamir [18] used the hardness of quadratic residuosity to build an efficient identification scheme. Many other identification schemes appeard afterwards, all relying on the hardness of number-theoretic assumptions. Some cryptographers took a different line of research, and tried to design identification scheme from different computational assumptions, not relying on number theory, but instead on the NP-hardness of some specific combinatorial problems.
One of the very-first combinatorial identification scheme was proposed by Shamir [42] , and relied on the hardness of the Permuted Kernel Problem (PKP). Later on, Stern proposed in [43] a scheme based on the intractability of Syndrome Decoding (SD), and in [44] a scheme based on the intractability of Constrained Linear Equations (CLE). Finally, Pointcheval [41] proposed a scheme related to the hardness of the Perceptron Problem, originating from the area of learning theory. All these problems are NP-complete (as opposed to IP1S). The designers proposed practical parameters, aiming for a security level of 2 64 or more, which are summarized in table 1. In all these schemes, it is required that all users share a public common set of information, a "common setting", usually describing the instance of the hard problem. For instance, in number-theoretic problems, the description of the curve, or of the group over which a discrete logarithm problem is considered is a common public information. While this information is not a "key" stricto sensu, it must nevertheless be stored by the prover and by the verifier, leading to higher memory requirements. However, in some case it can be chosen randomly, or generated online from a small seed using a PRNG. Table 2 . Concrete parameters for IP1S. Patarin proposed challenges A,B,C and D in [35] . We introduce challenge E.
On the contrary, the IP1S-based identification scheme proposed by Patarin in [34, 35] does not need the prover and the verifier to share additional information (except maybe the description of the finite field, which is very small). It works very similarly to the original identification scheme based on a zero-knowledge proof system for GraphIsomorphism (GI) by Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson [25] . One of the reasons for replacing GI by IP1S is the existence of efficient heuristic algorithms for GI, capable of solving efficiently random instances. The generation of hard instances of GI is a delicate matter [19] . Replacing the GI problem by IP1S yields shorted key, and random instances of IP1S were a priori secure. Patarin proposed concrete parameters, which are shown in table. 2. The PKP and SD schemes lead to bigger keys than IP1S, while the Perceptron scheme leads to comparable key-sizes, and CLE yields smaller keys than IP1S, if we neglect the additional memory requirement imposed by the common setting.
These IP1S challenges cannot be attacked using the existing techniques [17, 23, 40] . So the best attack remains exhaustively searching for the secret key. As a final note, let us mention that Lyubashevsky recently proposed in [30] to build an identification scheme using the hardness of lattice problems, but did not propose concrete parameters.
Cryptanalysis of Quadratic IP1S
The main observation underlying our quadratic IP1S algorithm is that by differentiating equation (1), it is possible to collect linear equations between the coefficients of S and those of S −1 . We denote by Df :
Df is defined by:
It is easy to see that Df (x, y) = Df (y, x). If f is a polynomial of total degree d, then Df is a polynomial of total degree d, but of degree d − 1 in x and y. Thus, when f is quadratic, then Df is a symmetric bilinear mapping. Going back to the quadratic IP1S problem, for all vectors x, y ∈ (F q ) n , we have:
Using the change of variable y ′ = S · y, this equation becomes:
Since a and b are of total degree 2, then Da and Db are bilinear (symmetric) mappings. In this case, since equation (2) is valid for all x and y, then in particular it is valid on a basis of (F q ) n × (F q ) n , and substituting fixed basis vectors for x and y yields linear equations between the coefficients of S and those of S −1 . This idea for obtaining linear equations can also be described relatively simply using the usual theory of quadratic forms (with the tweaks required by the fact that we are working in characteristic two). If F q is a field of even characteristic, then the set of homogeneous quadratic polynomials in n variables over F q is in one-to-one correspondance with the set of symmetric matrices with zero diagonal. Let P (a k ) denote the matrix of the symmetric bilinear form associated with a k (it is related to the polar form of a k in odd characteristic). Recall that the coefficient of index (i, j) of P (a k ) is Da k (e i , e j ), where (e i ) 1≤i≤n is a basis of (F q ) n . We then have:
Each one of these u matrix equations yields n 2 linear homogeneous equations between the 2n 2 coefficients of S and those of S −1 . These last u · n 2 homogeneous linear equations cannot be linearly independent as they admit a nontrivial solution S −1 , S . The kernel of S is thus non-trivial, and our hope would be that it describes only one solution. When u is strictly greater than two, we then have much more linear equations than unknowns, and we empirically find only one solution (when the polynomials are randomly chosen). When u = 2, which is again the most relevant case, the situation is unfortunately not as nice; Theorem 1 below shows that the kernel of S is of dimension higher that n -in fact, we will show below that it is of dimension at least 2n. This means that solving the linear equations cannot by itself reveal the solution of the IP1S problem, because S admits at least q 2n solutions, out of which only very few are actual solutions of the IP1S instance 5 . However, the linear equations collected this way can be used to simplify the resolution of the IP1S problem.
When looking at one coordinate of (1), we have an equality between two multivariate polynomials that holds for any value of the variables. Therefore the coefficients of the two polynomials can be identified (this is essentially the algorithm presented in [17] ). This yields a system S quad of u · n 2 /2 quadratic equations in n 2 unknown over F q . With u = 2, this precisely gives n 2 equations in n 2 unknown, which cannot be solved by any existing techniques faster than exhaustive search.
However, we now know that S lives in the kernel of S, and therefore S can be written as the sum of k = dim ker S matrices that can be easily computed using standard linear algebra. Identifying coefficients in (1) then yields a system S quad of u · n 2 /2 quadratic equations in k unknown. Our hope is that k is small enough for the system to be very overdefined, so that computing a Gröbner basis of S quad is polynomial in theory, and feasible in practice.
The analysis of the attack then proceeds in two steps:
1. Estimate the rank of S (i.e., the value of k).
Estimate the complexity of the Gröbner basis computation.
For the sake of simplicity, we will analyze the attack algorithm under some assumptions on the input system. For instance, we will assume that that n is even, and that one of the two quadratic forms we are dealing with is nondegenerate. We will then argue that a random instance satisfies this assumption with high probability, but we are well aware that some structured instance may not. This is in fact quite logical, because a worst-case polynomial algorithm for IP1S would imply a worst-case polynomial for Graph-Isomorphism (a fact that would be quite surprising). The situation of the IP1S problem is in this respect quite similar to that of GI: heuristics are capable of dealing efficiently with the random case, while some very special instances make them fail (interestingly, hard instances for GI are transformed into hard instances for IP1S through the reduction). Lastly, we mention that our algorithm does not necessarily fail on an instance that does not meet our assumptions. However, we no longer have a guarantee on its running time. Random instances fail to meet the assumption with a small probability, but we empirically observed that the algorithm solves them in reasonable time as well.
Counting Linearly Independent Equations
Obtaining guarantees on the number of linearly independent equations in S is the most important and the most delicate part of the attack. Since dim ker S is a function of the instance, it makes sense to consider the random variable giving dim ker S assuming the instance was randomly chosen. Fig. 1 above shows its (experimentally observed) distribution for various sizes of the base field. We immediately see that in odd characteristic, dim ker S is often n, while in characteristic two it is often 2n. In the sequel we provide mathematical arguments to back this observation up. We will focus on the (harder) case of fields of characteristic two, since this is the more cryptographically relevant case.
Our results are expressed in terms of the similarity invariants P 1 , . . . , P s of a matrix M . Their product is the characteristic polynomial of M , P s is the minimal polynomial of M , and P i divides P i+1 . The main technical result needed to understand the rank of S is the following theorem. Theorem 1. Let A 1 , A 2 , B 1 , B 2 be four given matrices of size n × n with coefficients in F q . Let us consider the set of all pairs (X, Y ) of n × n matrices satisfying the following linear equations:
Let us assume that S admits at least one solution (X 0 , Y 0 ) with both X 0 and Y 0 invertible, and that A 1 is also invertible. 1 . ii) n ≤ dim ker S. iii) Let P 1 , . . . , P s be the similarity invariants of C. Then:
Proof. Because a solution of S exists, then B 1 is invertible. Thanks to this, we can write:
Using the particular solution X 0 then gives:
From there, it is not difficult to see that the kernel of S is in one-to-one correspondance with the commutant of C, the isomorphism being (X, Y ) → X −1 0 · X. The second point of the theorem follows from the well-known fact that n lower-bounds the dimension of the commutant of any endomorphism on a vector space of dimension n (see for instance [7, Fact 2.18.9] ). The third point follows from a general result on the dimension of the commutant [20, chapter 6, exercise 32] .
⊓ ⊔ Theorem 1 directly applies to our study of the rank of S with A i = P (a i ) and B i = P (b i ). However, it holds only if P (a 1 ) or P (a 2 ) is invertible (we may swap them if we wish, or even take a linear combination). Note that since P (a 1 ) is a random skew-symmetric matrix, it cannot be invertible if n is odd, and the analysis is more complicated in that case. This is why we focus on the case where n is even, and where one of the two quadratic forms is nondegenerate. The following lemma gives us the probability that P (a i ) (or P (b i )) is invertible.
Lemma 2 ([31], theorem 3).
Let N 0 (n, r) denote the number of symmetric matrices of size n × n over F q with zeros on the diagonal and of rank r.
If n is even, the probability that P (a 1 ) is invertible if q = 2 is about 0.419 (this probability increases exponentially with q). The probability that either P (a 1 ) or P (a 2 ) is invertible is then about 0.662 when q = 2.
Theorem 1 is then applicable in more than half of the cases when q = 2 (and we expect this proportion to grow very quickly with q). When it is applicable, what guarantee does it exactly offer? We would need to know something about the similarity invariants of C. An easy case would be when the minimal and characteristic polynomials are the same (then there is only one invariant factor, and it is precisely the characteristic polynomial). Then Theorem 1 tells us that the dimension of ker S is n. For random matrices, the probability of this event is given by the following lemma. [21], theorem 1) . Let c(n, q) be the proportion of cyclic n × n matrices (i.e., matrices for which the minimal polynomial is of degree n). We have:
Lemma 3 (
And asymptotically, we have:
For random matrices over F 2 , and for n big enough, the proportion of cyclic matrices approaches 0.746. Unfortunately, C is hardly a random matrix. In odd characteristic it is the product of two symmetric matrices, while in characteristic two it is the product of two symmetric matrices with null diagonal. The product of two such matrices is very far from being random, and it is in fact never cyclic, as the following result shows.
Theorem 2 ([6]). Let M be a non-singular matrix of even dimension. Then the two following conditions are equivalent: i) M can be written as the product of two symmetric matrices with null-diagonal.
ii) M has an even number of similarity invariants P 1 , . . . P 2ℓ , and P 2i+1 = P 2i+2 .
Corollary 1. If n is even and C is invertible, then ker S has dimension at least 2n.
Proof. By theorem 2, C has at least two invariants, both equal to the minimal polynomial of C (which thus happens to be of degree n/2). Then theorem 1, point iii) shows that ker S has dimension 2n. If C has more invariants, ker S can only be of higher dimension.
⊓ ⊔ Corollary 1 shows that with a constant probability (when the two quadratic forms are non-degenerate) dim ker S is greater than 2n, which sounds like bad news. When C is not invertible, theorem 2 no longer holds (there are counterexamples), but what does apparently still hold is the fact that the minimal polynomial of C has degree at most n/2, and this would be sufficient to show that in all cases dim ker S ≥ 2n, in accordance with Fig. 1 .
What we would in fact need to know is the probability that ker S is exactly of dimension 2n. Theorem 1 still connects this dimension to the similarity invariants of C, even though C is not a uniformly random matrix. It seems plausible that C is unlikely to have a very high number of similarity invariants, and that the most common situation is that it has only two invariants (twice the minimal polynomial). We could not compute explicitly this probability, and we could not find ways to obtain it in the available literature. We measured it experimentally and found 0.746 (after 10 5 trials) when q = 2. This is strikingly close to the result brought by lemma 3 in the random case. Under the conjecture that C has two invariant factors with this probability, then theorem 1 tells us that in about 75% of the cases, dim ker S = 2n. The empirical probability seems to be even higher, as shown by Fig 1. 
Solving Very Overdefined Quadratic Systems
The solution of the IP1S instance (1) is systematically the solution of a system S quad of n 2 quadratic equations. In the previous section, we argued that we can reduce this system to n 2 equations in 2n unknowns with high probability, and (much) more unknowns with negligible probability. The system is so overdefined that it can almost be resolved by linearization. Indeed, it has NThis last fact can be theoretically justified. It is well-known that Gröbner basis algorithms [15, 16] are more efficient on overdefined systems. The complexity of most algorithms strongly depend on a parameter of the ideal called the degree of regularity. Indeed, the cost of computing a Gröbner basis is polynomial in the degree of regularity D reg of the system when the ideal has dimension zero, i.e., when the number of solutions is finite. The computation of a Gröbner basis essentially amounts to solve a system of M sparse linear equations in M variables, where M is the number of monomials of degree D reg in N variables. The complexity of this process is roughly O N 3·Dreg , with 2 < ω ≤ 3 the linear algebra constant, and N the number of variables of ideal considered (in our case, N = 2n).
The behavior of the degree of regularity is well understood for "random" systems of equations [3, 4, 5] (i.e., regular or semi-regular systems). It is conjectured that the proportion of semi-regular systems on N variables goes to 1 when N goes to +∞. Therefore, we can assume that for large N a random system is almost surely semi-regular. This is to some extent a worst-case assumption, as it usually means that our system is not easier to solve than the others. The coefficients of the Hilbert series associated with the ideal generated by a semi-regular sequence of m equations in N variables coincide with those of the series expansion of the function f (z) = 1 − z 2 m /(1 − z) N , up to the degree of regularity. The degree of regularity is the smallest degree d such that the coefficient of degree d in the series expansion of f (z) is not strictly positive. This property enables an explicit computation of the degree of regularity for given values of m and N .
Furthermore, the available literature readily provide asymptotic estimates of the degree of regularity for semigeneric ideals of N + k or α · N equations in N variables, but unfortunately not for the case of α · N 2 in N variables, which is the situation we are facing here. We thus tabulated in table. 3 the degree of regularity for semi-regular systems of equations having the same number of equations and unknowns as those occurring in our attack. From this table, we conclude that for any reasonable value of the parameters, the degree of regularity will be 3, and thus computing a Gröbner basis of S quad should have complexity at most O n 9 . In practice, the maximal degree reached by the F 4 algorithm on our equations is two, which is even better. Table 3 . Degree of regularity of random with the same parameters as those occuring in our attack.
Implementation
We demonstrated that the algorithm described in this section terminates in time O n 6 on a constant fraction of the instances. This reasoning is backed up by empirical evidence: we implemented the algorithm using the computer algebra system MAGMA [9] . Solving the equations of S quad is achieved by first computing a Gröbner basis of these equations for the Graded-Reverse Lexicographic order using the F 4 algorithm [15] , and then converting it to the Lexicographic order using the FGLM algorithm [14] . This implementation breaks the random instances of IP1S in very practical time. For instance, Challenges A and C are solved in a few seconds. Challenge E takes a few minutes, but the dominating part in the execution of the algorithm is in fact the symbolic manipulation of polynomials required to write down the equations of S quad . Actually solving the resulting quadratic equations turns out to be easier than generating them. We never generated a random instance that we could not solve with our technique, for any choice of the parameters.
There are only public parameter sets, and no public challenges to break, so we unfortunately cannot provide the solution of an open challenge to prove that our algorithm works. However, the source code of our implementation is available on the webpage of the first author.
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Cryptanalysis of Cubic IP1S
In this section, we focus on the case where a and b are composed of a single cubic polynomial. We assume that a and b are given explicitly, i.e.:
As already explained, we can restrict our attention to the homogenous case. The techniques developed previously for the quadratic case cannot directly applied in this setting. Indeed, the differential is no longer a bilinear mapping, and then there is no obvious linear equations between the coefficients of a solution and those of its inverse. However, we can combine the use of the differential together with the Gröbner basis approach proposed in [17] . We denote by S 0 = {s 0 i,j } 1≤i,j≤n a particular solution of IP1S between a and b, i.e., it holds that b = a • S 0 . For all vectors x, y ∈ (F q ) n , we have:
0 · y). a and b being of total degree 3, the coefficients of S 0 and S −1 0 appear with degree two in the expression of Da and Db above. Let R be the ring K[s 1,1 , . . . , s n,n , u 1,1 , . . . , u n,n ]. We consider the algebra A s of all n × n matrices over R. Let S = {s i,j } and U = {u i,j } in A s be symbolic matrices. We denote by I a,b the ideal generated by all the coefficients in R of the equations:
It is easy to see that U = S −1 0 and S = S 0 is particular solution of this system, and also a solution of IP1S between b and a. Our goal is to provide an upper bound on the maximum degree reached during a Gröbner basis computation of I a,b .
We prove here that D reg = 2 for I a,b under the hypothesis that we know one row of a particular solution S 0 , i.e.,
we assume then that we know the following ideal J = s 1,j − s
1,j | j = 1, . . . , n . Proof. We use the fact that the degree of regularity of an ideal is generically left invariant by any linear change of the variables or generators [28] . In particular, we consider the ideal I ′ a,b generated by all the coefficients in K[x 1 , . . . , x n , y 1 , . . . , y n ] of the equations:
It is clear that I
′ a,b is obtained from I a,b by replacing S (resp. U ) by S 0 (I n + S) (resp. (U + I n )S −1 0 ). Thus, the degree of regularity of I ′ a,b and I a,b are equal. Using the same transformation, the ideal J becomes
We now estimate the degree of regularity of the ideal I We will show that many new linear equations appear when considering equations of degree 2. To formalize this, we introduce some definitions related to the F 4 algorithm [16] . In particular, we will denote by I d,k the linear space generated during the k-th step of F 4 when considering polynomials of degree d.
Definition 1.
We have the following recursive definition of I d,k :
Roughly speaking, the index k is the number of steps in the F 4 /F 5 [16] algorithm to compute an element f ∈ I d,k (F ). We show that I 2,1 (F ) contains exactly n 2 +2n linear equations. This means that we have already many linear equations generated during the first step of a Gröbner basis computation of F . Lemma 4. I 2,1 (F ) contains the following linear equations:
Proof. From the first row of the following zero matrix S · U we obtain the following equations:
Using the equations s 1,j = 0 from the ideal J ′ , we obtain then u 1,1 = 0, u 1,2 = 0, . . . , u 1,n = 0.
⊓ ⊔
We can also predict the existence of other linear equations in I 2,1 (F ).
Lemma 5.
For all (i, j) ∈ {1, . . . , n} 2 the coefficient of 
Proof. We consider the coefficient of the monomial m = y 1 y i x j in the expression
Since the monomial m is linear in x j it is clear that the corresponding coefficient in ∆ a = Da(S 0 (S + I n )x, y) is also linear in the variables s i,j ; moreover this coefficient is non zero. We have now to consider the coefficient of m in ∆ b . Since Db(x, y) is the differential of an homogenous polynomial of degree 3 we can always write:
where ℓ i,j (resp. q i ) is a polynomial of degree 1 (resp. 2). Consequently, the coefficient of m in Db is also the coefficient of y 1 y i in q j ((U + I n )S −1 0 y). That is to say, in q j (y) we have now to replace y = (y 1 , . . . , y n ) by ((U + I n )S −1 0 y). Thus, modulo the equations of the ideal J ′ and (4), we can write the product ((U + I n )S
Hence the coefficient of y 1 y i in q j ((U + I n )S is a constant. ⊓ ⊔ 6 more precisely, generically non zero.
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To summarize:
Lemma 6. I 2,1 (F ) contains exactly n 2 + 2n linear equations.
Proof. In I 2,1 (F ), we have n linear equations from lemma 5, n linear equations from the very definition of J ′ , and n 2 linear equations from lemma 5 ⊓ ⊔
As explained before, we obtain n 2 + 2n linear equations for I 2,1 (F ). However, we have 2n 2 variables. So, we have to consider I 2,2 (F ), i.e., the equations generated at degree 2 during the second step. Thanks to lemma 6, we can reduce the original system to a quadratic system in 2n 2 − (2n + n 2 ) = (n − 1) 2 variables. W.l.o.g we can assume that we keep only the variable u i,j where 2 ≤ i, j ≤ n. Let F ′ be the system obtained from F after substituting the 2n + n 2 linear equations of lemma 6. All the monomials in K[x 1 , . . . , x n , y 1 , . . . , y n ] of Da(S 0 (S+I n )x, y)−Db(x, (U +I n )S −1 0 y) have the following shape:
Hence the number of such monomials is 2n
= n 2 (n + 1) ≈ n 3 , which implies that the number of equations in F ′ is also n 3 . Thanks to this remark, we will now prove that we can linearize F ′ . Let T (F ′ ) be the set of all monomials occurring in F ′ . We can assume that
It is important to remark that t 1 = u 2,2 up to t (n−1) 2 = u n,n are in fact variables. Now, let M be the matrix representation of G ′ w.r.t. T (G ′ ). Since we know precisely the shape of the equations from the proof of lemma 5, it is possible to establish that:
1. most of the equations are very sparse, namely each equation contains about n 2 non-zero terms. 2. all the variables t 1 , . . . , t (n−1) 2 occur in all the equations After a Gaussian elimination of the matrix M , we obtain the following shape:
Hence, we obtain after a second step of computation in degree 2 the equations u 2,2 = · · · = u n,n = 0. This means that after 2 steps of computation at degree 2, we obtain (n − 1) 2 + 2n + n 2 = 2n 2 linear equations in 2n 2 unknowns. This explains why the maximum degree reached during the Gröbner basis computation of I ′ a,b + J ′ is bounded by 2, and concludes the proof of theorem 3. ⊓ ⊔
Application to the Linear Inhomogeneous Case
If c = 0 in equation (1), and if a has a non-trivial homogeneous component of degree 1, then looking at the homogeneous component of degree one yields the image of S on one point. We are then in a situation where theorem 3 is applicable, and S can be determined though a Gröbner basis computation which terminates in time O n 6 .
Implementation and Application to the Other Cases
All the other cases reduce to the linear homogeneous case, as mentioned in section 2. In this setting, the problem is that we do not have enough knowledge on S to make the Gröbner basis computation efficient. A simple idea would be to guess a column of S then compute the Gröbner basis. This approach has complexity O n 6 · q n as explained before. It is possible to reduce this complexity by a factor of q, by discarding guesses for the column of S that yields different values of a and b on the corresponding points.
The biggest proposed cubic IP1S challenge (Challenge C in fig. 2 ) has u = 1, n = 16 and q = 2. Given one relation on S, the computation of the Gröbner basis takes 90 seconds on a 2.8Ghz Xeon computer using the publicly available implementation of F 4 in MAGMA. Since this has to be repeated 2 15 times, the whole process takes about one CPU-month (and can be parallelized at will). For challenge D, the Gröbner basis is computed in 0.1 second, and the whole process takes about 2 hours.
An Interesting Failure
We conclude this section with a simple idea that could have lead to an improvement, by efficiently giving a relation on S, but which fails in an interesting manner. Let us denote by Z a (resp. Z b ) the set of zeroes of a (resp. b). Because of lemma 1, and since S is linear, we have:
This yields a relation on S, which is enough to use theorem 3. a and b may be assumed to have about q n−1 zeroes. Finding them requires time O (q n ). The complexity of the attack could thus be improved to O n 6 + q n . Surprisingly, this trick fails systematically, and this happen to be consequence of the Chevalley-Warning theorem [10, 45] .
Lemma 7.
The sum of the zeroes of a cubic form on 5 variables or more over F q is always zero.
Proof. Let us consider the elements of Z a having α as their first coordinate, and let us denote by n α their number. These are in fact the common zeroes of (a, x 1 − α). By the Chevalley-Warning theorem [10, 45] , if a has at least 5 variables, then the characteristic of the field divides n α . Therefore, their sum has zero on the first coordinate. Applying this result for all values of α shows that the sum of zeroes of a has a null first coordinate. We then just consider all coordinates successively.
Conclusion
In this paper, we present algorithms for the IP problem with one secret for two random quadratic equations and one cubic equation. As already explained, there are the most cryptographically relevant instances. Moreover, we explain the complexity, success probability and give sufficient conditions so that the algorithms work. We combine the use of the differential and the computation of Gröbner bases of very overdefined systems. All the proposed IP1S challenges can be broken in practice by the technique we describe, as the following In view of these results, we conclude that Patarin's IP1S-Based identification scheme is no longer competitive with respect to others combinatorial-based identification schemes [42, 43, 44, 41] .
